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TOLSTOY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
AESTHETIC FEELING
EUGENIO BENITEZ
THE IMPORTANCE OF" THE IMPORTANCE OF" ART
Once upon a time, a scholar, ascetic and relig-ious man named Abu
Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Shafi'i al-Ghazali
(AI-Ghazali, 1058-11 II) wrote a worl, called The Incoherence qf the Phi-
losophers, 1\ clever philosopher, Abu AI-\Valid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad
Ibn Hushd (Averroes, 112li-1 ID8), responded to this by writing The IlIco-
lurence (!l the Inroherence. In IVhat is Art;;, Tolstoy refers to the impor-
tance of art in order to ridicule it l He notes the attention paid to art,
music, theatre, filrn, and books in the press. I Ie notes the in\'(~stment of
gm'ernments in the support of museums, theatres and the like. He notes
the time spent by artists and perlilrmers in learning- their craft. He pres-
ents the most sardonic description of an opera rehearsal you will ever
read. He describes the eHilrt and money poured into art as "stupefying",
"repulsive", "a gigantic absurdity", and "utterly incomprehensible".~
I-Imv can art be so important that a peasant should have to sell his only
cow to pay the taxes that maintain the artist-producer in grand luxury~
1I0w could art be so important that labourers are conscripted into dan-
gerous occupations just to realise the grandiose productions of an aes-
thete. These are rhetorical questions for Tolstoy. They are what move
him to seek a definition of art that couldjusti(y the cHart and expendi-
ture. A contemporary philosopher' would phrase Tolstoy's concern as,
"IVlwt would it take to make Art so vitally important?"
I'd like to turn this question around in the way Averroes turned
AJ-Ghazali around. \Ve should attend to the int/lortance ql' the impor-
tance. Of course our circumstances are somewhat different to those of
Tolstoy's Hussia: the peasant doesn't have to sell his cow to pay the
art-tax. Governments don't throw their money away on art, but save it
fill' more necessary things lil,e weapons and war. Artists (most of them)
aren't maintained in luxury by poor plumbers and electricians. But if
you poke around there is still something stupefying- about the impor-
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tance of art. In dark corners of the city, under rocks and behind the
filing cabinets, you will find artists who are willing to ma!«: the most
incredible sacrifices. Some local musicians, clearly more talented and
creative than the latest pop idols, played their last gig befi)re an audi-
ence of five in a dingy concrete pub sewral floors up in a North Sydney
ollice building. A prop-man lor a city theatre company, a real creative
genius who can make or fix anything, has just spent two weel,s making
a machine that tires two tennis halls simultaneously in opposite direc-
tions. A writer of astonishing ingenuity could be found, until recently,
sitting in a little boat-tumed-desk in a makeshift ollice in an old brick
warehouse, answering the phone fi)r a catering company that, for legal
reasons, didn't want to speak to anybody. These people, and many more
like them give their lives to art, not caring about remuneration. It seems
utterly incomprehensible. Yet in every land, in every age, under all
conditions, such people give their lives to art, without even worrying
whether what they do is useful, or beneficial or improving. I think, then,
that the phenomenon of artistic production requires us to recognise
that art is important. The question is not, "what would it take to make
art become so important" but rather, "what is there, in the phenomenon
of artistic production, that reveals its ar.tua/ importance to us:>"
In this paper I want to consider Tolstoy's view about the importance
of aesthetic feeling, hut I think it is useful right fi'om the start to see
how the way he puts the question about art directs the answer he gives.
By asking what it would take to make art vitally important, Tolstoy
is practically forced into tying art to universal brotherhood, altruistic
sacrifice, ,md Christianity. II' Tolstoy had sought instead what there
already is about art that ma],es it vital, he still could have written as
he did about beauty and feeling (criticising beauty as a criterion for
art and praising the communication of feeling), without such religious
overtones. I think Tolstoy's discussions of beauty and feeling still have
relevance for us, though his discussion of the religious dimension of
art docs not. I think Tolstoy was right that olle of the important things
about art (though surely not the only important thing about it) is the
way it is concerned with feeling. On that point he still has a lot to teach
us, though his observations need clarification. That is what I shall try
to uo in this essay.
THE CRITICISM OF BEAUTY
Let us take up first the criticisms that Tolstoy has of the theory that
art is fi)r the production of beauty. [t appears to Tolstoy that in the two
thousand years between Plato and himself; little progress has been made
168
EUGENIO BENITEZ
in the theory of art. He considers the many attempts to define art in
terms of beauty. The problem lies in saying what beauty is. One can try
to locate beauty in objective properties of art products: in symmetry, in
order, in proportion, in "the harmony of the parts"-all the thin~s that
Plato considered under the headin~ of "the appropriate". Tolstoy has
the sallie difficulty that Plato had. however. Either the appropriate can't
be specified in a way that enables it to serve as a uscliilrriterion, or else
it cuts too deeply into the canon, excising as "non-art" products that we
think are as central as can be.
\Vhat are we left with? .Just two alternatives: to make beauty into
an objective universal by referring it to a transcendental realm, or to
allow that beauty is a sul~iective concept and identif)' it with whatever
is aesthetically pleasing (by "aesthetically pleasing" I mean that which
pleases just in terms of its aesthetic properties-the colour, or the
sound, or the movement, etc.). Tolstoy rejects the \'iew that beauty is
whate\'er pleases on the same grounds that Plato r~ierted it, namely
that pleasure merely results li'om the experience of beauty, it is not the
cause of a thing's being heautiful. But he goes lilrther than Plato does
by criticising the view that beauty is transcendental. To define beauty
as "a manifestation of the absolutely perfect" is "a tantastic dclinition,
founded on nothing," he says.:l Tolstoy's criticism at least shows that
without a clear and substantial delinition of beauty, there is no sense in
saying that beauty is the aim of art.
I t is important to consider this criticism, because it establishes a
condition that Tolstoy's definition of art must satisfy. If the aim of art
is the cOlllmunication of feeling, as Tolstoy maintains, then it should
be possible to provide a clear and substantial definition of feeling. That
task, however, must f~lce an in-principle objection, and the qualifica-
tions nceded to get around it threaten to undermine Tolstoy's cntire
argument. I do not thinl, the objection is decisive, but the response to
it shows that there is more similarity than Tolstoy would like to admit
between the defInition of art in tel' illS of beauty and the dellnition of
art in terms of fi:~eling. But let us lool, first at what Tolstoy has to say.
THE THEORY or FEELING
How are we to dcline art if not in terms of beauty? Tolstoy reviews a
number of definitions current in the last century and rejects them. Each
of those delinitions has proponents among philosophers today, but it is
Tolstoy's own definition that is most interesting. According to him, art
is the production of a cOllllllllnity of feeling. It requires that a feeling
or set of feelings be objectitled by the producer alld through this objec-
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titication be addressed to others generally. For example, on this view,
when a musician composes a "Iamcnt" (taking "lament" as the namc of a
musical trope), she transf(wms her own actual pain into a unique product
that is capable, upon hearing, of ilm~cting others with the same pain.
Let's consider the elements of this view. First, there is the idea that
art is a limn of commulllcalion. I wonder just how essential this is. It
means that there can be no such thing as "private art" or a "private
artist". But imagine now someone I shall call, "the internal poet", who
really composes verses, but considers thcm so intensely personal that
she is unable to communicate them. She never writes them down or
speaks them aloud. 'Vet she claims to be a poet, and participates in illl
the poetry festivals. She stands before the audience, closes her eyes,
and doesn't speak, she merely recites the poems to herself Now I'm not
asking whether she or her silence count as an, but whethcr her poems
do. By Tolstoy's definition they do not. From here, consider a poet
who actually puts pen to paper, but alwilYs burns his poems; one who
speilks them aloud, even shouts thelll out in desolate places, but never,
ever within earshot of a human being. Do we have art yet? Suppose the
comllIunication talies place, but by an accident, as it were, against the
producer's intentions. Bernini is said to have sculpted "Costanza" only
for himself; let us say, then, that we hilve her against his wishes. Does
that mean that what has been described as the greatest sculpture since
Michelangelo's "David" is not art? \Vhat if the artist intends to COn1l1111-
nicilte but fails? Suppose thilt Shelley hnd a lIIilnuscript on him when he
went to the bottom of the seil. \Vas there a work of art there? Or only
potential nn? These questions I thinl\, are hard to decide.
Notice, however, that Tolstoy's condition of comnllll\ication is actu-
ally Illuch stronger. Art involves comlllunication to a group of indefi-
nite largeness. Personal or one-to-one comllllll\ication is not art. As an
example of whilt the implications of this ilre, consider the fiJllowing
tale, which I call "the perpetuitioned correspondence":
Long ago, in the I :.th century there lived in Holland a tulip nallled
Pieter Cos who was very f()nd of a certain rose, Esperaza Blanca, that
grew in a bright valley of the Sierra Morena, in Spain. Mijnheer Tulip
wfote lIlany beautiflil love-poellls to Sei\orita Hose, aIIII she wrote
back, in even lIIore florid language, of her love Illr hilll. Many years
later the ldters were collected by a group of Pais-Bas nasturtia who
thought thelll not only highly poetic hilt also f1orosophical. The letters
were passed on fl'olll one pel'ellllial to another IIntil finally they callie
into the hallds of a Monsieur Fleur-dc-Lys, who published thelll, with
the explicit COllsent and tacit approval of the Frcnch Hepnhlic, under
the title: Flurilt~gilill/: I,e.; eades des all/OIil'S b(Jlali/(llIt~s. Paris: editiolls des
belles lettl'es, I i():;.
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On Tolstoy's \'leW, when the letters were private comlllunications and
only intended so, the poetry they contained was not art, Did they
become art when they were discovered and appreciated by the nas-
turtia:> Or' only when they became published and promulgated? And
if the last, is it Monsieur Fleur-de-Lys who is the artist, since he is
the communicator (just like an artist presenting a "found object")? The
condition of public comnllll1ication is more diflicult to accept than the
mere cOlllmlll1ication condition, It points out a problem with Tolstoy's
definition, He is more concerned with who art is for than he is with what
art is fex, To him, art must be for the sake of communicating feelings
to "mankind", rather than just filr the sal,e of expressing feelings, I
wonder, however, if this doesn't come into tension with his view, which
we will consider later, that an artist must be sincere. I t's not that I think
there is a contradiction, but rather that we often thinl, sincerity is IllOst
clearly expressed when a person does whatever she does regardless of its
impression on others. A clear sign of sincerity would lie in the artist's
/lot caring whether the production was comnllll1icated to others or not.
Yet an artist could care a lot about e.rpressiflg feeling, with expressing
it well and clearly, if only for himself Even the internal poet could, in
this way, work creatively and artistically with words. On this view her
sonnets would be art. Rut the correspondence of Seiior Tulip and Mrs.
Rose might not be: if the aim was just to comnllll1icate feeling, and not
specifically to express it, the letters would be just love-letters, and not
yet art. And perhaps that's how it should be.
Let us make an adjustment to Tolstoy's definition of art, then. Let's
say that it is not the cOllllllllnication of feeling that is necessary, but
the expression of feeling. This is a good start, but the definition needs
to be further clarified. \Ve need to look Illore closely at the relation
between art and feeling. I'd like to begin with a distinction Tolstoy
makes between (and no\\' I'll replace the word 'com/llunication' with
'expression') the expression of thought and the expression of feeling.
I suppose he means by the expression of thought just passing along
information, and with that everything that has to do \\'ith science. The
expression of feeling is then left to art. In ordinary speech, of course,
this is an impossible distinction to maintain. AllIlost e\'erything we say
comlllunicates feeling as well as information. And even scientific writing
has its own spare, elegant, aesthetic. But we can surely distinguish the
fmphasis and aim of expression: if what is emphasised is feeling, or if
the aim of expression is primarily to evoke a feeling, then to that extent
we have lIlet a condition of art, even if the vehicle of expression is
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exactly the sallie as lIIight be used to convey information. There is a dif..
fl'lTnce between the presentation of this diagram:
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on a chalkboard in a physics classroom (where it produces little if
any emotional reaction) and the presentation of the sallie diagram
on a giant artscreen at a rave (where it provokes a wildly enthusiastic
response). It is clear that the difference has something to do with the
expression of infi)rnlation in the lirst context and the expression of
teeling in the second.
Plato suggests (.~)'I/Iposiulli21 I-~ 12) that the aim of art is to produce.
in the presence of heauty. something real and true. But this example of
Tolstoy's distinction between information and emotion shows that there
must be something more (or ditlcrent) to art than that. As a diagram of
a Lorentz translormation, the graph expresses sOlllething true; but it
becomes art when we see it as expressing something more (or ditlerent).
and it is clear that whatever else it expresses has to do with leeling. At
the same time it's not easy to say in what way feeling is involved. I can
try to show this by considering three examples of artistic production.
the whole point of which concerns not expressing feelings. The lirst
comes fi'om a short romantic comedy which I call. The Dialogue qf
'1awlI and h!fimnalioll, This is not a dialogue whose aim is to express no
feeling, hut one in which the characters are prohibited li'om expressing
feelings. In The Dialogue lit' TaWil alld hi!iml/olion, Tatsache and Ennui
meet in the world's crappiest internet chat room, a place called i-Chal.
The interfilce in i-Chal provides you with the ability to type only the 26
letters of the English alphabet. all lower case. There are no colours. ~o
special fonts. No italics. boldface. etc. No punctuation to make sideways
faces with. ~o "ellloticons". There are. moreover, very strict rules. the
violation of which will get yOll instantly and permanently kicked out.
For example, you may only communicate using simple dechlrative sen-
tences, withollt any evaluative vocabulary; and you are not allowed to
say anything about how you feel. IJere is a portion of the dialogue:
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T: the cat is on the mat
E: two plus two is !cllir
T: salt is souium chloriue
E: the stickleback is a species of !ish
T: the order of elements in any set is determineu by a principle
external to that set
E: in siugapore they usually eat with a !clI'k and a spoon
Consider fi)r a moment whether this scene can be art. I thinl\ it can.
Do the characters express feeling? ;\fot in any usual way. The scene
expl'esses a q/lali~)', namely what it's like not to he able to express feeling.
Is that a feeling? Not exactly. So just what does the scene express
hesides infilrmation;J It seems to express something non-cognitive about
feeling, a meta:fi'elillg if you will.
Consider a second example. Actors sOlnetimes train using what is
Imown as a "naive masl\", a masl\ with relatin~ly few and ambiguous
expressive features. Let's conceive of a play whose aim is to express
neither information nor feeling. In this play, called "lfi", the curtain rises
on two actors, in white body suits and naive masl\. They stand beflwe
the audience for five or six minutes. They don't move. They don't say
anything. They breath in an even and almost imperceptible way. Then
the curtain falls. Is it art? Again, I want to say it is. \)oes it express
feeling? Not in any usual way. But it expresses s01l/etlzlllg dillerent fi'om
infi)rmation. \Vhat is it? It seems to he a mood or an emotioll, and that is
not exactly the same thing as a feeling.
Finally consider some relatively recent paintings, lil\e Blark Square by
Kasimir Male\'ich, or (Jut '-!l Step with the IVorld hy Tom Sachs. These
paintings belong to a style called "slIprematism" which is not intended
to be expressionless. Their expression is supposed to be profillll1d and
in general superior to the expression of mlll1llane feelings. But even if
they express some deep truth, it can hardly he said that they express
mere infilrmation. So what sort of thing do they express? I lere it seems
as though the paintings express an entire orientation to the world, and
that is not the same as a meta-tCeling or a 1I100d.
This last example helps to make a point about the difliculty of saying
what art expresses that is non-informational. It is Iii\(: trying to express
the eidetic in a discursi\'e way. It can't actually be done. Tolstoy's word
"feeling" is .iust as good a word as any for it. But now it appears that the
term "feeling", understood as the non-informational, non-discursive,
qualitative, emotive or orientational element of artistic expression, is
.iust as mysterious as the term "beauty" was. It's hard to avoid the cir-
cular definition: art is expression that is artistic. This is what I referred
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to earlier as an in-principle objection: we cannot state infl)rmativcly
what is l1on-infclI'mational in artistic expression. Thus Tolstoy cannot
provide a clear and substantive definition of feeling (just as Plato could
not provide a clear and substantive definition of beauty).
Let's not give up on feeling just yet, however. Tolstoy himself
recognises that his basic definition of art is extremely broad. So he
strengthens it with criteria Illl' the manner and achievement of expres-
sion which determine the quality of an artistic production. I Ie thinks
that to be good art, a production must be "infectious" (the more infec-
tious it is, the better the art), and he argues that what makes a produc-
tion inlectious includes three factors:
(I) the individuality of the feeling
(2) the clearness of the expression, and
(:3) the sincerity of the artist
These criteria, too, are open to o~iections. In particular, the criterion
of sincerity seems to add nothing to the theory of artistic expression.
Nevertheless, I think the lirst two criteria are helpful at indicating when
feeling of the relevant sort is actually expressed, as well as what the
expression of such feeling accomplishes. They also help explain the
enduring popularity and admiration that attends some artistic produc-
tions. Let's consider the critcria a little more carelill]y, thell.
(I) The individuality !.!l thejeeling. Tolstoy has exactness of expres-
sion in mind here. Every leeling, whethcr it is described in a
general or specific way, is individual. If I leel depressed, it's my
depression, nobody else's that I lee I. But, being depressed, I proD-
ably won't takc the trouble to express it in a very exact way, I'll
probably just sigh and hang my head. Yet if someone wcre to put
it in words like this:
A grief without a pang, \'()id, dark. and drear.
A stifled. drO\\'sy, unimpassioned grief:
\Vhich finds no natural outll'!, no relicf~
In word, or sigh, or tear
(Coleridge. Ii'olll Deler/um:.'111 Ode)
he would start to reveal its individuality, and turn leeling into art.
\Vith care and ingenuity, practically any fi.'e1ing can be expressed
very exactly by words. Indi\'idual feelings can be expresscd very
exactly in painting and other art lorms. On Tolstoy's view, if you
looked at two paintings and said of the lirst one "it makes me leel
anxious", but of the second one, "it makes me feci that instability
of expectation you get when your when your lover is returning
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1\'0111 a six-week absence, your balance is unsteady, your pulse is
uneven, your mouth dry, ami your stomach becomes an ocean of
evaporation" then the second painting is better art. But it is not
the description that shows the second is the better work; it is the
feeling that is expressed by the work which shows it to be better.
\Ve must resist the temptation of subduing all art forms to the
medium of description. Yet without the description, we will have
problems identi(ying a very exact teeling, and problems knowing
whether others who arc profoundly allected by a work experience
the same feeling. In practice, then, this first criterion leads to an
emphasis on cOllJplexity and refinement in art, that is, to physical
manifestations of exactness.
(2) The clan()' qf the expression. Clarity may seem at first just like indi-
viduality, but it is not so much about the preciseness or refinement
of expression as it is about the ctfectiveness of comllllll1icating
it. Even a general, inexact feeling, such as determination, might
be communicated ellectively by a simple cartoon drawing. Of
Tolstoy's three criteria, this one is probably most closely related
to infectiousness. There is great pleasure when a feeling is clearly
communicated and widely shared. On this view the more widely
shared the feeling is, the better. Dick Bnma's 1'v[i[b' gives us a
good example of clear expression that is nevertheless simple and
general; not relined art.
The criterion of clarity can be seen as the complement to the
criterion of individuality. It will be genuinely diflicult to produce
a work that expresses highly individual feelings which are at the
same time widely shared and easily received. Such a work, however,
will show why art is actually important.
(:3) The sincerity rif' the artist, It's important to note that Tolstoy
thinks of sincerity as a criterion related to the infectiousness of
art, For him it turns out to be the most crucial of all three criteria,
For him it comprises and sums up all the rest. Tolstoy believes that
if only an artist is sincere (he doesn't say anything about talented
or diligent!) then she will express her feelings exactly and clearly.
This is an overstatement. Indeed, one of the reasons sincerity
has COllie to be a special expectation of artists is just because the
feelings expressed in contemporary art tend to be so vague (that
is, the first two criteria are not met). Nowadays when we believe
that an artist is sincere, then even if her work docs not express
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feelings that are refilled or clear, we may fll1d ourselves admiring
and praising- it. In fact, in some cases it may be on!;)' sincerity that
we can praise. Thus, insincerity has become the great sin of con-
temporary art. Mass production and conllllercialisation installtly
reduce our estimation of art that we can't feel. Artists arc roundly
criticised fl>r conullercialising self~promotion. But sincerity itself
is not bound to the expression of feelings, and it is hard to sec it
as having the importance to art of the other criteria. \Vould the
painting of the Sistine Chapel he any less a work of art if it turned
out that Michelangelo was an atheist? Sincerity is a general moral
criterion that docs not belong to thinking merely about the quality
of art. \Ve should expect everyonc to be sincere, whether they are
artists or not.
So, of the threc criteria that Tolstoy considers, only the first two are
really applicable to the question what makes art important, but together
they provide a powerful argument for the importance of aesthetic
feeling. They show that even though we cannot provide a rigorous defi-
nition of aesthetic leeling (or turn leeling into cognitive content), we
can appreciate, through art, fi.~cling that is at once highly intlividual ilnd
highly gcneral, and wc can determine the conditions for the manner and
achievement of such feelings. It would be interesting to sec if one could
provitle similar criteria Ii))" the manner and achie\'ement of beauty.
NOTES
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